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A General Experiment on Bargaining in Demand Games
with Outside Options
Abstract
This experiment factorially combined the major independent variables
from previous ultimatum and demand game experiments (discount factors, outside
options, probability of termination, and who is the first mover), and thus
provides a more general test of the behavioral predictions of the subgame
perfect equilibrium model. The results yielded considerably more support than
previous studies for the effects of equilibrium predictions, especially" for
the demands of players who had an outside option. Fair and equal outcomes
were proposed rarely unless they were advantageous for the proposer. Instead,
the results support the hypothesis that bargainers focused on a minimally"
acceptable offer, both in making their own demands and in considering the
likelihood that the other partv would accept their offer.

An elementary part of many two-party bargaining games, and the essence
of the endgame, is the take - it -or-leave - it ultimatum. Guth. Schmittberger
.
and Schwarze (1982) were the first to systematically studv bargaining behavior
in ultimatum games. Thev found an unexpected result: Rather than offering
the second party a verv small amount, many of the first parties' proposals
were near 50-50. Indeed, the strong game theoretic prediction, that the first
party could ask for almost all of the prize, was clearlv not supported.
Subsequent empirical research^- has continued to document that, in a
variety of situations, with a variety of variables, game theoretic equilibria
are poor predictors of people's behavior in demand games. Even when the games
are expanded to two or more periods, with offers alternating between the
players, there appears to be a strong pull toward 50-50.
Ochs and Roth (1989) were the first to conduct a multiple - factor
experiment of demand games, investigating two- and three -period games with
four combinations of discount factors for the two plavers. Although this
studv. arguablv the most comprehensive to date, generated a wide range of game
theoretic predictions, only a small range of behavioral outcomes resulted,
with mean first offers ranging between 50-50 and 60-40. In addition, their
regression analyses found that changes in the equilibrium predictions had no
significant impact on first offers. A third element of this paper, also
damning for the predictions of the equilibrium models, was an analysis and
review of counteroffers made following unpredicted rejections of first offers.
In Guth et al
. , (1982), Binmore et al . , (1985), Neelin et al . . (1988). and
Ochs and Roth (1989), rejection rates ranged between 15 and 20%. More
disturbing is the observation that 65 to 81% of the counteroffers were
disadvantageous: players typically demanded less than they had previously
been offered
.
This collection of results has generated considerable controversy, as
Guth and his colleagues (Guth and Tietz. 1988) contend that "the game
theoretic solution has nearly no predictive power." Binmore et al .
. (1985;
1989; 1991), on the other hand, claim more support for the game theoretic
predictions. In their first experiment (Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton. 1985),
the game theoretic prediction for the opening demand was 75 percent of the
total to be divided. While inexperienced subjects had a modal offer of 50
percent, experienced subjects had a modal offer of 75%. as predicted. In
another experiment (Binmore, Morgan, Shaked, and Sutton, 1991), results from
four games led to outcomes that approximated but did not strictly support
predictions
.
Ochs and Roth's (1989) results replicated many of the disparate findings
reported in previous research (including Binmore, et al
.
, 1985; Neelin,
Sonnenschein. and Spiegel. 1988; and Guth and Tietz. 1988), suggesting that
game theoretic predictions might be supported in some conditions but not
others. They concluded bv suggesting that players may suffer disutility from
accepting outcomes that thev consider insultingly low. Thus, plavers mav make
counteroffers demanding a "respectable" share of a smaller total rather than
accepting a low initial share. These speculations were augmented by a recent
study by Bolton (1991), who found that bargainers acted as if they were
negotiating over both absolute and relative outcomes. This concept is further-
amplified in research on "social utilities" by Loewenstein, Thompson, and
Bazerman (1989).
Guth and Tietz (1990) also presented a general review, and concluded
that a loose model, incorporating elements of fairness with equilibrium
predictions, mapped the data observed thus far. In two-period games with a
shrinking total, game theory predicts that the first player should demand a
share that is roughly equal to 1-d. where d is the discount factor. A bargain
based completely on considerations of fairness would result in a 50-50 split.
Guth and Tietz (1990) found that as negotiators became more experienced, first
round demands approached a compromise between these two extremes, demanding
.75-. 5d. One aspect of the experiment we report here tests this model.
The recent experiments of Binmore et al . (1989; 1991) investigated the
effects of outside options in potentially infinite games. Rapoport , Weg , and
Felsenthal (1990) also studied potentially infinite games, investigating the
effects of variations in the costs of continuing for the two players (similar
to discount rates in other studies). Results showed that, with experience,
unequal cost functions generated increasingly extreme pavof f s . as predicted.
Thus, four studies (Binmore et al
.
. 1985. 1989. 1991: Rapoport et al
.
.
1990) have provided some support for game theory's predictions. The two
(Binmore et al
.
. 1985: 1989) that investigated games with subgame perfect
equilibrium near 50-50 led to bargaining outcomes varied around 50-50, and do
not counter Guth and Tietz 's (1987) contention that more extreme equilibrium
predictions have received no empirical support. The other two studied
infinite games.
The experiment reported here attempted to be more comprehensive in its
scope. Our factorial design combined the four major independent variables
that had been studied individually or in pairs in previous research. This
provided for a more general test of game theory's behavioral predictions.
Given the mixed support for the predictions of equilibrium models, our basic
goal was to determine when they can accurately predict behavior in demand
games
.
The current study, like Binmore et al . (1989: 1991). included the
possibility of an outside option as one independent variable. One of the
players in half of these demand games could opt out for either 90% or 10% of
the total payoff (which started at $10). In the other half of the games, one
player would receive this same outcome if the game ended, but could not
exercise this option unilaterally.
To increase generalitv. the games had probabilities of termination, p.
of either .05 or .50. Games with p - . 50 approximate one- and two-period
ultimatum games: games with p - .05 approximate the infinitely repeated game
(e.g.. Rapoport, et al
.
, 1990).
We also manipulated discount factors, allowing the prize monev to shrink
bv 20% after each period in half of the games (d - .8); in the other half, the
prize monev remained the same, with d - 1.
The variables in this studv contribute to a set of predictions that span
a considerable range: one plaver or the other should demand anvwhere from 5 to
97% of the pavoff (see Table 1). This provided an opportunitv to test whether
subgame perfect equilibrium predictions might be supported only when they are
near 50-50. or whether extreme predictions might also be supported when
outside options were available.
A final element in the design was repeated play, which provided for a
test of the effects of experience. Although Ochs and Roth (1989) and Bolton
(1991) did not find strong effects for experience. Binmore et al . ' s (1985)
proposition that experience is important warrants additional testing.
The game theoretic predictions for this experiment follow Rubinstein
(1982), who addressed the general case, and Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky
(1986), who addressed the infinite horizon case where one party can opt out
and collect a guaranteed payment of, say, x. While this right appears to give
that party an advantage, Binmore et. al (1986) show that such an option
influences the equilibrium only if x > the equilibrium prediction where the
option does not applv. For example, in an infinite game where the parties can
divide $10 that does nor. get discounted over time, the Nash cooperative
solution is a $5-$5 split. This prediction holds when either party has the
right to opt out for x < $5. Then the opt out threat is not credible, since
the predicted outcome exceeds x. Outside options onlv serve as constraints on
agreements. If x > $5. then the equilibrium prediction gives the option
player x (the "deal me out" solution; Binmore , et al
.
, 1991) and the opponent
receives the remainder.
Experimental Design
Our experiment used a2x2x2x2x2 design (see Table 1). We
manipulated: a) two discount factors, d - 1 or d - .8; b) two probabilities
of termination conditional on a rejected offer, p — .05 or p - .5; c) player
2's outside option, s - 10% or 90% of the total currently- available for
negotiation; d) the presence or absence of the option player's right to
unilateral lv opt out of the negotiations: and e) which plaver was the first
mover. Players experienced games with both outside options and alternated who
was the first mover in their repeated negotiations. Thus, first mover and
outside options were repeated variables; discount rates, the probability of
termination, and the right to opt out (or not) were between factor variables.
The parties started bargaining over $10 in each case.
To illustrate, consider the treatment with d ^ .8, p = .05, s- 10%. and
where the option player, player 2, cannot opt out and player 1 makes the first
offer. Player 2 can either accept or reject this offer. If player 2 rejects,
then a 5% random draw determines whether the negotiations continue. If the 5%
chance comes up. the negotiations end, and player 2 receives 10% of $10, or
$1, while player 1 receives nothing. If the 5% chance does not come up, the
3total to be divided and the outside option shrink to $8 and 80 cents,
respectively. Player 2 now makes the next offer. The negotiations continue
with the players alternating offers until a breakdown or an agreement. When
player 2s had the right to opt out, thev could exercise it anytime, rather
than proposing or responding to an offer. When d - .8 and s - 90%, player 2s
tended to opt out before the second round of offers (when their option would
also shrink by a factor of .8). Thus, player 2s often opted out rather than
either accepting or rejecting a poor offer; they also opted out rather than
making an offer and risking a rejection.
In the Appendix, we compute the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes for
each condition, displayed in Table 1. Several features of these predictions
are worth noting. First, initial movers are predicted to have an advantage,
which is most pronounced when s - 10%, p - .5, and d - .8, although it is
nearly" as large when d - 1. When p is .5, the game resembles an ultimatum
game and a 10% outside option should pose almost no constraint on the outcome.
Second, with a positive p. the outside option should be an advantage,
even when s - 10% (Binmore et al . 1986). Of course s - 90% should provide an
even bigger advantage.
Third, when d = 1, the right to opt out should not matter: a player can
wait with no cost (other than time and the effort of rejecting offers) until a
breakdown to get s. Player 2s can guarantee themselves the outside option,
even without the right to opt out. Alternatively, when d = .8, the right to
opt out for a 90% option obviates the possibility of having to wait for a
potentially smaller payoff at breakdown.
Fourth, since the 10% option is generally not credible, the right to
exercise it should not matter. However, the status quo wealth of the player
with the 10% option includes the expected value of the option in the event of
a breakdown. Thus, the existence of the option should influence the outcome,
in contrast to models with no chance of breakdown (Binmore, Rubinstein and
Wolinsky, 1986).
Fifth, reducing d from 1 to .8 should not always favor first movers.
For example, with no right to opt out and s - 90%, the option plaver should do
better with d - 1 since waiting for a breakdown is worth less when d - .8.
This difference should be especiallv pronounced when p - .05. On the other
hand, when s — 10%. d - .8 should give the first mover a larger advantage than
otherwise- -a condition resembling finite demand games without outside options.
Procedure
Participants in the experiment were undergraduates (typically juniors
and seniors) in marketing and management classes who volunteered for monetary
prizes that depended on their performance as well as a small, fixed amount of
extra course credit (a long standing norm in these courses). Groups of six to
sixteen individuals participated in a session. Participants were randomly
assigned to be plaver Is or plaver 2s. Player 2s had an outside option for
every game: plaver Is never did. Plaver Is and 2s sat on opposite sides of a
large classroom, facing away from each other. Players were monitored to
insure that no one knew the person with whom they were bargaining.
Sessions began with a series of practice games, where a fictitious $2
was divided. Player 2s' outside options in the practice games were 60% of the
money available (starting at $1.20). Player 2s who could opt out in the
experimental games could also opt out in the practice games.
For the practice games d was .9 and p was .01. Players responded to a
series of hypothetical first offers and made a series of first- and second-
period demands (which were based on the assumption that they may have rejected
a first-period offer).
They then proceeded to the "money" sessions, where they were told that
one game would be randomly selected to determine how much monev they would
actually receive. They were encouraged to do as well as thev could on each
negotiation, as they wouldn't know which game would determine their monetary
outcome until the end of the experiment.
They were told that they would negotiate with a different player each
game. (In sessions with many games and/or few players, bargainers sometimes
negotiated with the same opponent more than once. No one, however, negotiated
with the same person on consecutive games.)
The games always started with a division of $10. Games ended with the
acceptance of an offer, player 2 opting out, or the game terminating. The
probabilitv of termination was kept constant within each game, at either .50
or .05. We flipped a coin after each period to determine whether the game
would continue in the .50 condition. We randomly selected a chip from a dish
that contained 19 white chips and one green chip to determine whether the game
would continue in the .05 condition: selection of a white chip meant the game
continued; selection of a green chip meant the end. All of the information in
the experiment was shared and common knowledge.
For any single game d and p remained fixed across games; participants
were reminded of them prior to each game. The value of the outside option
(starting at $1 or $9) and who made the first offer (player 1 or 2) rotated
every game and was noted in the instructions before each game. The effects of
d on the payoff and the outside option were displayed before each game; their
shrinkage was announced prior to each round of each game . Player Is made the
first offer in the odd-numbered games, player 2s in the even-numbered games.
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The outside option started at $1 in games 1, 2. 5, 6, 9. 10, 13, 14, 17, and
18, and $9 in games 3. 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 15. and 16. Experimental sessions
included from 4 to 18 games. This was not known prior to plav. Thus,
although each game was terminated with a fixed probability, the sessions were
terminated approximatelv one half hour before the experiment's advertised
termination point. The end was announced onlv after the last game was
completed
.
Plavers making offers filled out offer slips that were collected and
delivered to the appropriate plaver bv the experimenters. Plavers receiving
offers could accept or reject them. Plavers who had the opportunitv to opt
out could do so at anv time. Plavers were told whether their offer was
accepted or rejected or whether the other player had opted out. If the game
continued, the other plaver made the next offer, dividing an amount reduced by
20% if d was .8.
A lotterv at the end of each experimental session selected the game that
determined their monetary pavof f s . Participants completed a short post-
experimental questionnaire and were paid their winnings. Anv questions about
the experiment were answered. Subjects were asked not to reveal details about
the study to others, and could request a final report of the results at the
end of the experiment.
Results
The results will be presented in several sections in an attempt to
comprehensively depict the bargaining process. The first section is an
overview of the main effects and interactions of the variables manipulated in
the study. The second section presents a series of sharp tests of the
equilibrium predictions. The third presents the effects of equilibrium
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predictions on opening demands. The fourth analyzes the effects of
experience. The fifth describes the frequencies of agreements, breakdowns,
and choices to opt out. The sixth checks for a possible first mover
advantage. The seventh and eighth address 50-50 proposals and disadvantageous
offers and counteroffers. The last section describes the success of different
bargaining strategies.
Overall Analyses
As shown in Table 2, opening demands (as well as demands over all
rounds, which were very similar) were signif icantlv different from predictions
in 23 of 32 cases [p < .05, two-tailed]. Eight of the nine remaining cases
occurred when s — 10%, where predictions were closer to 50-50. When s was
90%, player 2s who could opt out frequently made opening demands of 90%. They
seemed reluctant to ask for more, even though equilibrium predictions suggest
that thev should. Their behavior reflected the "deal me out" solution
(Binmore, et al
.
, 1989). At the same time, these demands were much more
extreme than those observed in previous demand game experiments.
An analvsis of variance of the deviations of first demands from
equilibrium predictions included the five independent variables (player 1 or
2: p - .05 or .5; d - .8 or 1; s - 10% or 90%; and whether the player with the
option could opt out) in a fully saturated model. Main effects resulted for
each of the variables except whether the player with the option could opt out.
Player 2s, who had the option, consistently demanded less than predicted
(-.075); player Is demanded more (.151), especially when s was 90% (.25; see
Table 3). when s was 10%, demands were close to but just less than predicted
(-.025). No shrinkage of the payoffs (d - 1) led to higher demands than
predicted (.069): when d was .8, demands were near equilibrium (.006).
Finally, when p was .05 demands exceeded equilibrium predictions (.065), while
p - . 50 led to near-equilibrium demands, on average (.013).
Manv interactions were significant, the most comprehensive being a four-
way interaction that included all the of the variables except p (see Table 3).
Most of the means in Table 3 are significantly different from zero (i.e.. the
prediction). As noted, plaver 2s demanded less than predicted. Plaver Is
demanded more when d was 1 or, particularlv , when s was 90 'A . This effect was
accentuated (.470) when player 2s could not opt out and the payoff didn't
shrink (d - l)--here, player Is' demands were near or greater than 50-50 (see
Table 2). Clearly, player Is were particularly resistant to offering most of
the pavoff to plaver 2s, even when a breakdown meant nothing for them and 90%
for player 2.
Tests of Equilibrium Predictions
The equilibrium model predicted that the right to opt out should not
matter for s - 10% as threats are not credible (Binmore. Rubinstein and
'/oi insky . 1986). This hvpothesis cannot be rejected in seven of the eight
possible comparisons. Further, the equalitv hvpotheses cannot be rejected
when thev were tested jointlv. Specificallv , we regressed the opening demand
(DEMAND) on d, p. p*d , and a dummy variable for whether player 2 had the right
to opt out (OPT), separately for each plaver when s was 10%. The effect of
the right to opt out was .024 (t[133] - 1.100) for player Is and -.004 (t[114]
-
-.192) for player 2s, not significant in either case. These results provide
some support for the game theoretic predictions.
The equilibrium model also predicts that the right to opt out should not
matter when d = 1 since player 2 can simply wait* for a breakdown to collect
the option. We tested this hypothesis by regressing opening demand on p. a
dummy variable for the 90% option of (HIGH). p-HIGH. and OPT, separately for
each player In the d - 1 conditions. The OPT results were -.139
(t[126] -3.84, p < .001) for player Is' opening demand and .039
( t [ 122 ] 1.99. p < .05) for player 2s'. rejecting the prediction. Further
stratif ication indicated that these restrictions were accepted when s was .10
but nor. .90. Specifically, for player Is (with d 1 and s .10). the effect
of OFT (controlling for p) on opening demands was -.011 (t[61j - -.32); when s
was .90. the effect of OPT on player Is was -.26 (t[64] - -4.47. p < .001).
For player 2s, s - .10. and d - 1, the effect of OPT was -.019 (t[57] - -.72);
when s was 90% it was .094 (t[64] - 3.44, p - .001).
The final equality test concerns pi aver 1's demands when player 2s can
opt out for a 90% option and d - .8. Here p should not affect player l's
demand, since player 2 can opt out if player 1 offers less than 90%. The
equality prediction cannot be rejected [t(27) -.46]. However, in each case
player Is' average offers were only 71-75% of the total (i.e.. they demanded
25-29%; see Table 2). Evidently, player Is would rather have had player 2s
opt out than make offers of 90% or more. Also, when s 90% and d — 1, the
right to opt out led to plaver Is being less aggressive and player 2s more
aggressive, acknowledging player 2s' bargaining power (Table 3).
Nevertheless, player Is still asked for more than predicted and player 2s
asked for less. In particular, the players apparently underpredicted the
likelihood of a breakdown if they kept rejecting each other's offers. Such
myopic behavior may be similar to that observed in Neelin, et al . . (1988).
Effect of Equilibrium on Opening Demands
Although the results reported above provide only partial support for the
equilibrium predictions, regression analyses show a strong relationship
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between predictions and demands. When we regressed opening demands (DEMAND)
on equilibrium demands (EQ) for the pooled sample, we obtained the following
resul ts :
1) DEMAND - .296 + .545*EQ,
(.016) (.025)
suggesting that predictions significantly (bur nor. completely) affected
demands. ]t(507) - 22.06. p < .001]. The full sample results also show that
plaver 2s responded much more to equilibrium than plaver Is. When we
interacted EQ with PLAYER (i.e.. a variable equalling 1 for plaver 2), we
o uta ined
2) DEMAND = .326 + .493*EQ - .305*PLAYER + ,385*EQ*PLAYER.
(.018) (.041) (.054) (.076)
A one unit change in the predicted demand was associated with a change in
plaver i's opening demand of .493 [t(504) - 12.09. p < .01]; however, a one
unit change for player 2 was associated with a change of .879 !]t(504) - 13.71,
p < .01]. Further, the plaver-equilibrium interaction term was highly
significant t(506) — 5.07. p < .01], indicating that plaver 2s responded more
strongly to equilibrium than plaver Is.
We investigated the strong pull of equilibrium predictions further by
stratifying the regression sample bv the outside option conditions. The
findings were striking:
Option = 10%
3) DEMAND = .658 - .072*EQ - .08 6PLAYER + . 079*EQ*PLAYER.
(.085) (.147) (.127) (.206)
Option - 90%
4) DEMAND - .327 + .413*EQ - .407*PLAYER + . 590*EQ*PLAYER.
(.024) (.131) (.157) (.214)
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Equilibrium predictions were significantly related to opening demands only
when s was 90%: For player Is. the effect of a one unit change in the
equilibrium predictions on opening demands was .413 [t(248) - 3.16, p < .01];
for player 2s. Che change in opening demands was 1.00 [ r ( 24 ) - 5.93.
p < .01]. When s was 10%, changes in the equilibrium predictions led to non-
significant, near zero effects for both plavers: For plaver Is, the change
was -.072 [t(253) - -.492)]; for player 2s. it was .007 [(t(253) - .046)].
Thus, when the outside option was 90%, and 13 of 16 conditions predict
opening offers greater than .90 for player 2s, first offers moved with the
predictions for both plavers, particularlv plaver 2s. The other three
conditions led to serious drops in the offers to or demands of plaver 2s, as
predicted. Plaver Is were also consistent, offering less than predicted, and
much less than predicted when d was 1 and plaver 2 could not opt out. When
the option was 10%, however, and the predictions more closelv approximated
50-50, the effects of the predictions yielded nonsignificant regressions, even
though the mean outcomes in these conditions were not significantly different
from predictions half of the time (see Table 2).
Effects of Experience on Behavior
As noted, previous experiments found that players' behavior converged
toward equilibrium (Binmore, et. al , 1985) or toward the average of the
equilibrium prediction and a 50-50 split (Guth and Tietz, 1990) with
experience. Table 4 shows regression results for the effects of experience on
opening demands. Player 2s were more affected by experience than Player Is,
whose opening demands and responsiveness to equilibrium predictions were not
significantly affected by experience. Controlling for equilibrium, more
experienced player 2s' demands became significantly more conservative
17
[t(501) - -2.70, p < .01]; their opening demands were also more responsive to
equilibrium predictions [t(501) - 1.96, p < .05].
The effects of experience can also be used to evaluate Guth and Tietz'
(1990) conjecture that behavior in demand games converges toward a simple
average of the game- theoretic equilibrium and a 50-50 split. In this
experiment, this conjecture implies the following relationship between actual
opening demands and equilibrium opening demands:
5) DEMAND - .25 + .5*EQ.
Based on the interaction model in Table 4, the data exhibit following
relationships between actual and equilibrium behavior:
Flayer 1
6) DEMAND - .351 - .005*SESSION + .457*EQ + .007*SESSION*EQ
(.031) (.005) (.072) (.011)
j. a. V c L £-
7) DEMAND - .204 - .032*SESSION + .682*EQ + .034*SESSION*EQ.
(.095) (.014) (.122) (.018)
According to equations 6) and 7), player Is began the first session with
demands that were quite distant from the equilibrium prediction and more in
their own favor. The shift term in their opening demands is .346. which is
significantly greater than .25 [t(501) - 3.49, p < .01]; however, while the
impact of equilibrium was .464, which is less than .5, this difference is not
significant [t(501) - -.56]. In contrast to those without outside options,
player 2s began with demands toward the equilibrium side (which is also
favorable to them). For them, the shift term is .172, which is smaller than
.25, though not significantly so [t(501) - -.93]; but the impact of
equilibrium is .717, which is significantly greater than .5 [t(501) - 2.02,
p < .05].
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As play progressed, player Is' opening demands approached the Guth and
Tietz (1990) compromise between 50-50 and equilibrium, while plaver 2s' moved
toward equilibrium onlv when the predictions were quite high. Tor example, in
the seventh session, the following relationships between actual and
equilibrium demands resulted:
Player Is' Predicted Demands in the Seventh Session^
8) DEMAND - .318 + . 505*EQ
(.020) (.045)
Player 2s' Predicted Demands in the Seventh Session
9) DEMAND - -.021 + .924*EQ.
(.054) (.067)
Equation 8 shows that in the seventh session, the shift term for player
Is was close to, but significantly different from .25 ;t(501) - 3.45,
p < .01]; and the effect of equilibrium was almost exactly .5. For plaver 2s
(equation 9) , trie shift term was not significantly dij_j_erent from zero
t(50i) - -.39 i, and the effect of equilibrium was not significantly different
from 1 [t(501) - -1.14]. 3
l-^ucilIOuS / ninu y Le\cai lHcil v.iiCii rxavcL z. S cCJUiiluIIUiij uclLdiiu v. as
over 93% (a condition met in several games), predicted demands rose with
experience, but onlv slightly. They were never close to the extreme
equilibrium predictions. For example, when the equilibrium demand was 97%
(the maximum in our experiment), equation 7 predicts an opening demand for
Flayer 2 of 87% in the first session. By the 20th round (just outside the
range of our experiment), it predicts an opening demand of 89%. Thus, while
equation 9 supports equilibrium predictions, convergence toward equilibrium is
slow. This analysis suggests that the equilibrium predictions, at least on
the part of the player with the high option, both lingered and exerted strong
pulls
.
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Agreements . Breakdowns, and Choices to Opt Qui
While we have already discussed some effects of the discount factor, an
additional prediction related to the strike literature is that shrinking,
outcomes should Induce more agreements than fixed outcomes (Reder and Neumann.
19"0; Forsythe , Kennan and Sopher, 1991). This prediction is based on the
notion of disagreement costs. Even though game theory predicts immediate
agreement, computational costs mav be associated with reaching it. The
greater the costs of disagreeing, the more incentive the parties have to
overcome these complicated barriers. When the likelihood that an interaction
ended in agreement v. rather than breaKxiown or opting out) was analyzed using
probit analvsis , d had a significant negative effect on the incidence oi
agreements (p < .05, two-tailed test) when player 2 could not opt out'4 ,
supporting the efficiency argument. In addition, there was a significant
(p -c .01, two-tailed test) positive experience eiiect on the likelihood oi
avoiding ureakdown.
nuv.cvtri , iviicn pidVei. z. Uctu i. lie rignt CO up i OUl, u naU <_t i>l^
)
nlj-j.c<iiiLis
positive (p < .05, two-tailed test) snect on the probability that the
interaction avoided urearcdown. As Tabj.e -j shows, when s — 90/c , d — .o. ano
player 2 could opt out, player 2's opted out of 56-60% of the negotiations.
Many player 2s took the sure 90% early (before it shrank) rather than risk a
rejection bv player Is.
Also notable in Table 5 is the high incidence of breakdowns (61-65%)
when player 2 could not opt out, s - 90%, and p - .5. Player Is' demands were
at or above 50% in these conditions; plaver 2s' were near 90%. Not
surprisingly, few proposals were accepted.
The First, Mover Advantage
The equilibrium model predicts a higher pavoff when a bargainer made the
first offer. We regressed, separately for players 1 and 2, the final money-
outcome on a first mover status dummv variable and dummy variables for
treatment conditions. For player 2s, the impact of moving first, all else
equal, was $.162 (t[490] - 1.457): for player Is. it was $.074
(t[490] — .561). In addition to not being significant, the magnitudes of
these estimates are small in comparison to the average dollar outcomes of
$6.14 (Player 2) and $2.78 (Player 1), and to the average predicted first
mover advantage of $1.30. Although we found little support for the predicted
first mover advantage, it should have been less in a game with probabilistic
endpoints than in, say, a one period demand game.
Focal Points: 50-50 and 90-10 Splits
As noted, player Is' demands departed significantly from the equilibrium
predictions and toward 50-50 splits when s was 90%. Table 6 presents the
frequency of 50-50 opening offers. When p - .05 and s - 10%, 50-50
approximates the equilibrium prediction, and proposals of even splits were
frequent (n = 50/126; 39.7%). However, plaver Is demanded 50-50 splits just
as often (n - 13/30; 43.3%) when s was 90% and player 2 couldn't opt out.
Such behavior emphasizes the 50-50 split's impact as a focal point. However,
when player 2 could opt out for 90%, player l's demands for 50-50 were much
less frequent (n •= 5/61; 8.2%). Not surprisingly, when player 2s could opt
out or wait for a 90% outcome, they also made few 50-50 offers
(n - 3/102; 2.9%). This suggests that fairness, defined as equal outcomes,
was not a consistent concern in these games.
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We also investigated the prevalence of 90-10 as a focal point. When
player 2s could opt our. for 90%, player Is offered 10-90 splits 30 times in 96
opportunities (31%, with a range from 21 to 41% in the four conditions). This
suggests that the 10-90 demand is a focal point that was used at approximately
the same rate whether it was an equilibrium prediction or not. Alternatively,
when player 2 could not opt out but had an outside option of 90%, only one
player 1 offered 10-90 (in 148 opportunities).
A 90-10 split is never the equilibrium demand for player 2 (see Table
1). Player 2s opted out the majority of the time when their option was 90%
and d was 0.8. When thev didn't opt out, plaver 2s proposed a 90-10 split
31.5% (23 of 77) of the time (across all values of d and p)- -about as often as
player is. Also like player Is, they demanded 90-10 significantly less- -only
12.0% of the time (p < .01) --when they could not opt out but would still
receive 90% in the event of a breakdown. Thus, both parties made 90-10 offers
primarily when player 2s could opt out for 90%.
u~l Sauvantage ous Counteroffers
Disadvantageous moves could occur in three ways in this experiment.
First, as in previous studies, a player might make disadvantageous
counteroffers. Second, player 2s might make disadvantageous offers, demanding
less than their exercisable outside option. Third, player 2s might accept
disadvantageous offers that were less than their outside option.
Each of these behaviors was rare. A total of 914 moves (offers or
decisions to opt out) led to 433 rejections; only 14 (3.2%) counteroffers were
disadvantageous. Three times such behavior could be considered altruistic, as
the rejecting party offered the opponent more money than s/he had just
requested
.
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Second, in seven of 219 cases (3.2%). Player 2s demanded less than Che
outside option when they could opt out. These all occurred, nor surprisingly,
in the 96 cases (7.3%) where the option was 90%. Third, disadvantageous
acceptances occurred in only 3 of 231 cases (1.3%), all In the s - (H)X . d - 1.
right to opt out condition (n - 46: 6.5%). Clearly, altruistic behavior and
disadvantageous counteroffers were relatively rare.
Effect of Flayer Decisions on Outcomes
More aggressive demands might bluff an opponent into making more
conservative counteroffers. however, since a higher demand increases the
chances of rejection, such a strategy mav Increase the chances of a breakdown
or opting out.
To estimate the impact ol aggressive offers on outcomes, we regressed
the eventual pavoi_j_ oj_ the j_irst mover v, run separately xor pi aver is aiui
player 2s) on first round demands and dummy variables for the experimental
treatments (e.g. p - .05. d — 1, option — 90%, and player 2 can opt out). For
player Is. the effect of an Increase In the first round demand on the final
outcome was -.176 [t(^47) — - _> . 24
, p < .01 i; ior plaver ^.s, tne corresponding
effect was .088 [t(203) - .99, ns]. J Thus, moves toward equal splits led to
smaller payoffs for player Is; more aggressive demands by player 2s had little
effect on their final payoffs.
For games that continued after a rejected offer, we examined the impact
of the size of the rejected offer on the counteroffer. The effects were small
and not significant, indicating that bluffing did not improve an opponent's
counteroffer, and may have led to more breakdowns or opting out by player 2s.
Thus player l's attempts to avoid small outcomes resulted in dollar losses.
The pattern of accepted offers (Table 7) is similar to that for rejected
offers. When player 2 had no right to opt out and s was 90%. pi aver 1
averaged well above the equilibrium outcome. But when player 2s could opt out
for 907o, plaver l's accepted demands averaged .09-. 10."
Concl us ions
The most noteworthy result in this studv was the effect of outside
options: Unlike previous demand game experiments, the presence of high
outside options for one player pushed bargainers' demands far from 50-50
proposals. At the same time, however, behavior was significant! v different
from equilibrium predictions. Binmore , et al . (1991) reported similar results
for a smaller set of games and a less comprehensive set of experimental
conditions
.
Players with high, exercisable outside options often opted out. When
they didn't, their demands rarely exceeded the value of their outside option,
even though equilibrium predictions suggested that they should. Psvchological
theories of equitv (e.g., Adams, 1963) suggest that people are intolerant of
relative overcompensation and, particularly, relative undercompensation.
These results indicate that players with high options may have been somewhat
uncomfortable asking for more than their option, which might already be
perceived to be relative overcompensation. At the same time, however, they
may have feared that their offers would be rejected. Players who could
exercise high outside options did so, however, and didn't underplay their hand
as much as player 2s who had the high outside option but couldn't opt out.
This suggests that fear of rejection may have been more influential than
inequity.
Players without outside options resisted the weakness of their
bargaining positions. Player Is offered more when player 2s had high
exercisable options, but their average offers still fell around 70%- -much less;
than the 90% option. When player 2s could nor. opt: out, player Is demanded
about 50% of the pavoff--far more than predicted. These results all provide
support for Ochs and Roth's (1989) notions of a minimum acceptable outcome.
Guth and Tietz's (1990) model (for plavers without outside options), Bolton's
(1991) model of relative outcomes, and psychological models of equity. At the
same time, equilibrium predictions were influential, particularly for player
2s, in raising demands.
One alternative explanation for these findings, also pursued bv Bolton
(1991) is that players (like ours) who experienced multiple equilibria would
be more responsive to those different equilibria. The underlying rationale is
that seeing situations with markedly different strategic opportunities may
clarify the value of those opportunities. This was not the case here: Every
experimental session and every group of participants provided data that
supported the equilibrium prediction in some conditions and not others.
Bolton (1991) also found mixed evidence for the experience hypothesis. Thus,
we conclude, as did Bolton (1991), that the experience of multiple equilibria
does not explain these results.
While the existence of an outside option may explain why equilibrium has
some explanatory power in our results and in Binmore et ai . (1989; 1991), game
theoretic predictions have been rejected in other experiments with option-like
characteristics. Hoffman and Spitzer (1982 and 1985) presented bargaining
pairs with three alternative allocations of payoffs, each with a different
total dollar value. One player (the "controller") could unilaterally choose
among the allocations; however, the parties were also free to make binding
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contracts, and side payments were allowed. The controller was analogous to a
player In our games who had the right to opt out.
Hoffman and Spit.zer (1982) found that parties almost alwavs chose the
allocation with the highest total value (the Pareto optima] choice) with a
majority splitting the monev equally, despite the controller's ability to
choose the allocation. The fact that bargaining in their experiments was
face-to-face and parties made written contracts with side payments may have
contributed to the 50-50 splits.
In a related studv, Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986a) gave subjects a
choice between an $18-$2 split and a $10-$10 split of $20 between themselves
and an anonvmous other person. There was no opportunity for rejection, so
people bore no risk in asking for $18 rather than $10. Nonetheless, as noted
earlier. 76% of subjects divided the money evenlv. These results mav be due
to the limited range of choices given to subjects. Our results, and to some
degree those of Binmore et al
. (1989; 1991), present a more conservative
conclusion, that plavers who have a high option and the right to exercise it
use some but not all of their bargaining power.
Although our experiments created a pull toward game theory's equilibrium
predictions, participants exhibited only minimal evidence that their demands
were affected by considerations of fairness. wTiile players with high outside
options consistently demanded less than predicted, they demanded onlv slightly
less, possibly to avoid rejection rather than to be fair. Players with poor
outside options made demands that were often less than predicted but
consistently more than 50-50. Players without outside options demanded either
significantly more than predicted or more than 50-50. When player 2s could
opt out for a high payoff, very few 50-50 splits were proposed by either
player (5 out of 61 first demands, or 8.2% for player Is: 2 of 74, or 2.7%,
for player 2s). Thus, although 50-50 splits equalize outcomes and are a clear
focal point, evidence for fairness (defined here and In previous demand game
research as equal outcomes) is lacking in these games, as it was in Binmore et
al . (1991). Alternatively, however, fairness might be less irestrictively
defined, even to the point of encompassing minimally acceptable offers. This,
however, would mark a serious definitional change and would also reduce
fairness 's clear operational meaning.
These data make a strong case for Ochs and Roth's (1989) hypothesis that
players focus on a minimally acceptable offer, both in making demands and in
considering whether the other party will accept an offer. Thus, plaver 2s'
demands when the equilibrium demand was very high (e.g., 97%) increased only
slightly with experience, and never really approached the prediction. By
conforming to the notion of "deal me out", player 2s could reap a large payoff
while still making an offer that was acceptable to plaver Is.
Similarly, player Is' average offers never exceeded 75%, even when
plaver 2s could opt out for 90%. Although the two players' perceptions of
what constituted a minimally acceptable offer mav have differed, neither
pushed their proposals to the extremes of the equilibrium predictions. Both
acted as if minimally acceptable offers were an appropriate basis for their
bargaining demands.
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.
Equations 8 and 9 are based on equations 6 and 7 , simulated at the seventh
session.
3. While these effects for player 2s are not significantly different from
zero (shift term) and one (effect of EQ) individually, the joint hypothesis of
zero shift term and EQ term of one (assuming that they are in the seventh
session) was rejected [F(2 , 501)=28 . 909
,
p<.001]. Nonetheless, the results in
equation 5) are qualitatively very close to zero and one, respectively.
4. Explanatory variables in this analysis included session number and dummy
variables for d, p, and option size categories and whether the first mover had
the option.
5. Cases in which player 2 started the negotiations by opting out were
omitted in the player 2 regressions.
6. Note that when player 2 had the right to opt out, s = .9, p=.05, and d=.
accepted player 2 demands averaged .721. This is based on the 5 cases of
agreement in these conditions (i.e. player 2s opted out the other times);
three of the seven total disadvantageous offers were made in this condition.
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Table 1 : DESIGN AND EQUILIBRIUM PREDICTIONS EOR EIRST OEEERS
PLAYER 2s
PROB( TERMINATION)/
DISCOUNT RATE
CANNOT TREE TO
OPT OUT OPT OUT
10% OPTION 90°/ OPTION 10% OPTION 90% OPTION
PLAYER Is' DEMANDS .46-. 54 .05-. 95 46-. 54 .05-. 95
05 / 3
05 / .8
50 / .8
FLAYER 2s' DEMANDS .44-. 56 .05-. 95 44-. 56 .05-. 95
PLAYER Is' DEMANDS .56-. 44 .46-. 54 56-. 44 .10-. 90
PLAYER 2 s ' DEI-LANDS . 42 - . 58 . 3 5 - . 6
5
42
-.58 .08 -.92
PLAYER Is' DEMANDS .60-. 40 .07-. 93 .60-. 40 .07-. 9:
/ -1
PLAYER 2s' DEMANDS .30-. 70 .03-. 97 30-. 70 .03-. 97
PLAYER 1 s ' DEMANDS . 6 5 - . 3 5 . 1 8 - . 8 2 65-. 35 .10-. 90
PLAYER 2s' DEMANDS I6-.74 .07-. 93 .26-. 74 .04-. 91
Note: Each paired entry is the predicted proportion of the pavoff for
player 1 followed by the predicted proportion of the payoff for player 2
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Table 2: MEAN OPENING OFFERS
PROB(TERMINATION)/
DISCOUNT RATE
PLAYER 2s
CANNOT FREE TO
OPT OUT OPT OUT
10% OPTION 90% OPTION 10% OPTION 90% OPTION
05/1
05 / .8
50/1
PLAYER Is' DEMANDS 65- .35 62-. 38 62- .31 .25- .75
(prediction) (.46-. 54) (.05-. 95) (.46-. 54) (.05-. 95)
PLAYER 2s' DEMANDS .35-. 65 .15- .85 44-. 56* .08-. 92
(prediction) (.44-. 56) (.05-. 95) (.44-. 56) (.05-. 95)
PLAYER Is' DEMANDS 55-. 45* .51-. 49* .63- .37 25-. 75
(prediction) (.56-. 44) (.46-. 54) (.56-. 44) (.10-. 90)
PLAYER 2s' DEMANDS .43-. 57* .43-. 57 .43- .57' 16- .84
(prediction) (.42-. 58) (.35-. 65) (.42-. 58) (.08-. 92)
PLAYER Is' DEMANDS .63-. 37* .48-. 52 64-. 36^ 30-. 70
(prediction) (.60-. 40) (.07-. 93) (.60-. 40) (.07-. 93)
PLAYER 2s' DEMANDS .47 -.53 19-. 81 44- .56 07- .93
(prediction) (.30-. 70) (.03-. 97) (.30-. 70) (.03-. 97)
50 / .8
PLAYER Is' DEMANDS 59-. 41* 49-. 51 61-. 39* .29-. 71
(prediction) (.65-. 35) (.18-. 82) . (.65-. 35) (.10-. 90)
PLAYER 2s' DEMANDS .41-. 59 .15-. 85 .38-. 62 .09-. 91
(prediction) (.26-. 74) (.07-. 93) (.26-. 74) (.04-. 96)
Note: Each paired entry is the mean proportion of the payoff for player Is followed
by the mean proportion of the payoff for player 2s. N's ranged from 10 to 21 in each
cell. *'d entries are not significantly different from the prediction (p < .05).
Table 3: MEANS OF DEVIATIONS FROM PREDICTED FIRST ROUND DEMANDS FOR
SIGNIFICANT FOUR-WAY INTERACTION
Player 1 Player 2
10X OPTION 90% OPTION 10% OPTION 90% OPTION
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Player 2
Is Free to
Opt Out
d=l
d=.S
.104
(.024)
.022
( .020)
kk
.214
(.042)
**
.175
(-037)
**
-
.070
( .020)
-
.061x
( .023)
** **
- .037
(.005)
-
.080**
(.017)
Player 2
Cannot
Opt Out
d=l
d=.8
.089
(.029)
-.033
(.020)
**
.470
( .033)
kk
.167
(.043)
kk
-.077"
( .030)
-
.074**
(.024)
-
.137**
( .030)
-
.068x
"
(.018)
Mean .045
(.012)
**
.251*'
(.022)
-.070x
"
(.012)
-.076**
(.010)
Significantly different from zero, p < .05
r Significantly different from zero, p < .01
Note: Standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Table 4: EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE ON FIRST ROUND DEMANDS
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Ordinary Least Squares Coefficients
Constant
EQ
PLAYER
SESSION
EQ*PLAYER
EQ*SESSION
PLAYER*SESSION
EQ*PLAYER*SESSION
R- squared
n
0.303
(.019)
0.605
(.035)
0.047
(.021)
0.003
(.002)
0.497
509
0.351
(.031)
0.457
(.072)
-0.147
(.100)
-0.005
(.005)
0.225
(.142)
0.007
(.011)
-0.027
(.015)
0.028
(.021)
0.527
509
8 ( DEMAND )/5( SESSION)
(at mean EQ)
6 2 ( DEMAND )/6(EQ) 6 (SESSION)
Player 1
-0.0009
(.0079)
0.0068
(.0114)
Player 2
-0.0127
(.0047)
0.0345
(.0176)
F-test for interaction terms (Column 2): F(4,505) -= 7.487, p <.001
DEMAND=share of total demanded by focal player on first round
SESSION=session number
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Table 5 INCIDENCE OF OUTCOMES
PROB( TERM NATION)/
DISCOUNT RATE
PLAYER 2s'
CANNOT FREE TO
OPT OUT OPT OUT
10% OPTION 90% OPTION 10% OPTION 90% OPTION
Agreements 53% 85% 94% 65%
(10/19) (17/20) (34/36) (30/46)
.05 / 1 Breakdowns 47% 15% 6% 9%
(9/19) (3/20) (2/36) (4/46)
Opt Outs 0%
(0/36)
26%
(12/46)
Agreements 97% 100% 100% 44%
(29/30) (30/30) (40/40) (14/32)
.05 / .8 Breakdowns 03% 0% 0% 0%
(1/30) (0/30) (0/40) (0/32)
Opt Outs 0%
(0/40)
56%
(18/32)
Agreements 83% 39% 91% 59%
(30/36) (14/36) (29/32) (19/32)
.50/1 Breakdowns 17% 61% 9% 28%
(6/36) (22/36) (3/32) (9/32)
Opt Outs 0%
(0/32)
12%
(4/32)
Agreements 75% 36% 83% 41%
(21/28) (10/28) (29/35) (11/27)
.50 / .8 Breakdowns 25% 64% 14% 0%
(7/28) (18/28) (5/35) (0/27)
Opt Outs 3%
(1/35)
59%
(16/27)
Agreements 71.9% 74 .7%
Mean Breakdowns 29 . 1% 8 .2%
Opt Outs 18 .2%
Note: Bargaining pairs are the unit of analysis; frequencies are shown in
parentheses
.
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Table 6: THE FREQUENCY AND PERCENTAGE OF OPENING 50-50 OFFERS
PLAYER 2s'
PROB( TERMINATION)/
DISCOUNT RATE
CANNOT FREE TO
OPT OUT OPT OUT
10% OPTION 90% OPTION 10% OPTION 90% OPTION
05/1
PLAYER 1 DEMANDS 20% 40%
(2/10) (4/10)
PLAYER 2 DEMANDS 30% 10%
(3/10) (1/10)
PLAYER 1 DEMANDS 60% 60%
(9/15) (9/15)
45% 0%
(9/20) (0/16)
56% 0%
(9/16) (0/30)
29% 13%
(7/24) (2/15)
05 / .8
PLAYER 2 DEMANDS 20% 27%
(3/15) (4/15)
50% 13%
(8/16) (2/15)
50/1
PLAYER 1 DEMANDS 39% 39%
(7/18) (7/18)
38% 6%
(6/16) (1/16)
PLAYER 2 DEMANDS 72% 0%
(13/18) (0/18)
63% 0%
(10/16) (0/16)
50 / .8
PLAYER 1 DEMANDS 36% 21%
(5/14) (3/14)
24% 14%
(5/21) (2/14)
PLAYER 2 DEMANDS 36% 0%
(5/14) (0/14)
21% 0%
(3/14) (0/13)
Note: Frequencies are shown in parentheses
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Table 7: MEAN VALUES FOR ACCEPTED OFFERS* (ALL ROUNDS)
PLAYER ?s
CANNOT FREE TO
PROB(TERMINATION)/ OPT OUT OPT OUT
DISCOUNT RATE 10% OPTION 907, OPTION 107, OPTION 907, OPTION
05 / 1
05 /
50/1
50 / .8
PLAYER 1 DEMANDS .50-. 50 .49-. 51 .50-. 50 .10-. 90
PLAYER 2 DEMANDS .48-. 52 .33-. 67 .50-. 50 .11-. 89
PLAYER 1 DEMANDS .51-. 49 .49-. 51 .53-. 47 .10-. 90
PLAYER 2 DEMANDS .46 -.54 .45 -.55 .49 -.51 .28 -.72
PLAYER 1 DEMANDS .55-. 45 .27-. 73 .54-. 46 .09-. 91
PLAYER 2 DEMANDS .49-. 51 .27-. 73 .46-. 54 .08-. 92
PLAYER 1 DEMANDS .57-. 43 .26-. 74 .54-. 46 .09-. 91
PLAYER 2 DEMANDS .44-. 56 .21-. 79 .43-. 57 .09-. 91
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Appendix: Derivation of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium Predictions for
Experimental Conditions
This Appendix, which draws from Binmore , Shaked and Sutton (1989) and
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), computes the unique subgame perfect
equilibrium points for our experimental conditions. We assume an infinite
horizon, in line with the fact that our game does not have a deterministic
endpoint
.
Player 2 Can Opt Out
Assume that Player 2 has an outside option, equal to a share s of the
total to be divided. The option will be paid to him/her in the event of
breakdown. Suppose also that Player 2 can opt out and collect s. In the
event of breakdown or opting out by Player 2, Player 1 receives nothing. Let
the discount factor be d and the breakdown probability in the event of a
rejected offer be p. Let the size of the amount to be divided be 1.
Then let m^ and M]^ be, respectively, the greatest lower bound and the
least upper bound for Player l's equilibrium payoffs, when Player 1 moves
first. Let m2 and M2 be the corresponding values for Player 2 when Player 2
moves first.
Then we have
:
al) m^ > or » 1 max (d(l-p)M2 + ps , s
)
a2) 1 - M]_ > or - max {(l-p)dm2 + ps , s
}
a3) m 2 > or - l-d(l-p)Mi
a4) 1 - M2 > or = d(l-p)m^.
Inequality al) holds since in equilibrium, Player 2 will accept any
offer greater than the expression in brackets. On the other hand, Player 2
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must get at Least what it is in brackets in a.2) . Inequalities a3) and a4)
hold by reversing the order of the first offer.
We distinquish two cases: i) s < or = d(l-p)M2 + ps , and ii) s > or =
d(l-p)M2 + ps . Taking case i), we have, using al-a4):
X > or = (l-d+p(d-s))/(l-d2 (l-p) 2 ) , and
Ml < or - (l-d+p(d-s))/(l-d 2 (l-p) 2 ).
Therefore, m^ = M^ =
( l-d+p(d-s) )/( l-d 2 ( 1-p) 2 ) . Using similar reasoning, we have for Player 2:
m2 = M2 = (l-d(l-p)(l-ps))/(l-d 2 (l-p) 2 ).
Using this expression for M 2 , we have the following threshold for s:
case i) occurs when
s < or = (d-d2+pd2 )/(l-d 2 +pd2 )
.
Turning to case ii), we have:
s > or = (d-d^+pd 2 )/( l-d 2+pd 2 ) . In this case, the outside option binds,
and we have
:
m l
=
^1 = l~ s • anc*
m 2 = M 2 = l-d(l-p)d-s) .
A special case of this game occurs when d = 1- -there is no discounting.
In this case, the threshold for s is 1 ; whenever Player 2's outside option is
less than the whole amount to be divided, the option does not bind. However,
as can be seen from the above results, it still affects the equilibrium
through the exogenous breakdown probability.
Neither Player Can Opt Out
When neither player can opt out, conditions al) and a2) must be
altered:
al') mi > or = 1 - d(l-p)M 2 - ps , and
a2') 1-Mi < or = (l-p)dra 2 + ps
40
Inequalities al') and a2
'
) remove Che possibility of opting out. The
solutions for Player l's and Player 2's payoffs in this case are identical to
those when Player 2 can opt out but when the outside option is not binding.
This fact proves our assertion that when s doesn't bind (in the case where
Player 2 can opt out), having the right to opt out makes no difference. Since
s never binds when d = 1 (see above), having the right to opt out has no
effect with this discount factor. This is the basis for our equality
restrictions for the d = 1 case.
Appendix; Raw Data
I . Parameters; d=»l. p= .05. neither plaver can opt our.
Option Session Round
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
Mover Pie Mover Response Session
Option Size Demand ( l=agree Ends
( l=ves) (-l=opt 2=re ject (1 =
out
)
3=opt out
4=mover
opted out)
yes )
1000 600 2
1 1000 510 2
1000 500 1 1
1000 1000 2
1 1000 750 2
1000 500 1 1
1000 500 2
1 1000 1000 2
1000 500 2
1 1000 500 2
1000 1000 2
1 1000 600 1 1
1000 500 1 1
1 1000 500 1 1
1 1000 700 2
1000 600 2
1 1000 700 2
1000 600 2
1 1000 700 2
1000 550 2
1 1000 650 2 1
1 1000 750 2
1000 500 2
1 1000 599 2
1000 500 2
1 1000 550 2
1000 500 2
1 1000 501 2 1
1 1000 1000 2
1000 500 2
1 1000 999 2
1000 500 2
1 1000 800 2
1000 500 2
1 1000 700 2 1
1000 650 2
1 1000 1000 2
1000 900 2
1 1000 750 2
1000 550 2
1 1000 600 2
1000 501 1 1
1000 950 2
1 1000 700 2
1000 900 2
1 1000 650 2
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
100
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
1
5
6
7
8
9
1
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
1000 600
1 1000 500
1000 550
1 1000 500
1000 510
1000 500
1000 500
1 1000 1000
1000 300
1 1000 900
1000 600
1 1000 800
1000 400
1 1000 1000
1000 550
1 1000 990
1000 501
1 1000 980
1000 500
1 1000 925
1000 500
1 1000 910
1000 500
1 1000 900
1000 499
1 1000 890
1000 450
1 1000 875
1000 400
1 1000 1000
1000 700
1 1000 600
1000 600
1 1000 550
1000 500
1 1000 900
1000 500
1 1000 700
1000 500
1 1000 650
1000 500
1 1000 600
1000 500
1 1000 550
1000 500
1 1000 510
1000 500
1 1000 1000
1000 700
1 1000 1000
1000 1000
1 1000 1000
1000 500
1 1000 1000
1000 1000
1 1000 500
1000 600
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
.2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
3
4
5
6
1
2
1
2
3
1
1
2
1
2
3
4
1
2
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
1
2
1000
1000
1000
1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1 1000
1 1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
1000
1 1000
700
700
700
600
600
600
500
600
700
550
600
525
500
700
500
500
600
500
500
600
500
600
600
500
500
800
500
600
950
525
900
500
950
500
925
500
925
400
900
500
900
500
800
500
750
500
800
500
700
500
700
500
650
500
650
600
700
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
900 3 3 1000 500 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 600 2
900 4 2 1000 600 2
900 4 3 1 1000 600 2
900 4 4 1000 700 2
900 4 5 1 1000 700 2
900 4 6 1000 500 L 1
900 4 1 1 1000 700 2
900 4 2 1000 600 2
900 4 3 1 1000 600 2
900 4 4 1000 550 2
900 4 5 1 1000 600 2
900 .4 6 1000 700 2
900 4 7 1 1000 550 2
900 4 8 1000 500 2
900 4 9 1 1000 525 2
900 4 10 1000 499 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 500 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 975 2
900 4 2 1000 700 2
900 4 3 1 1000 950 2
900 4 4 1000 500 2
900 4 5 1 1000 925 2
900 4 6 1000 400 2
900 4 7 1 1000 900 2
900 4 8 1000 400 2
900 4 9 1 1000 875 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 950 2
900 4 2 1000 500 2
900 4 3 1 1000 925 2
900 4 4 1000 500 2
900 4 5 1 1000 925 2
900 4 6 1000 500 2
900 4 7 1 1000 950 2
900 4 8 1000 500 2
900 4 9 1 1000 925 2
900 4 10 1000 500 2
900 4 11 1 1000 950 2
900 4 12 1000 500 2
900 4 13 1 1000 915 2
900 4 14 1000 500 2 1
900 4 1 1 1000 900 2
900 4 2 1000 600 2
900 4 3 1 1000 800 2
900 4 4 1000 500 2
900 4 5 1 1000 750 2
900 4 6 1000 450 2
900 4 7 1 1000 700 1 1
Parameters: d=0 .8. p=.05 . neither Dlaver can opt out
tion Session Round Mover Pie Mover Response Session
Option Size Demand Ends
100 1 1 1000 700 2
80 1 2 1 800 400 1 1
100 1 1 1000 800 2
80 1 2 1 800 600 2
64 1 3 640 320 1
100 1 1 1000 500 1
LOO 1 1 1000 500 1
100 1 1 1000 500 1
100 2 1 1 1000 500 1
100 2 1 1 1000 500 1
100 2 1 1 1000 700 2
80 2 2 800 400 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 700 2
80 2 2 800 400 2
64 2 3 1 640 400 2
51 2 4 512 250 2 1
100 .2 1 1 1000 600 1 1
900 3 1 1000 500 1 1
900 3 1 1000 500 2
720 3 2 1 800 500 2
576 3 3 640 320 1 1
900 3 1 1000 550 1 1
900 3 1 1000 700 2
720 3 2 1 800 400 1 1
900 3 1 1000 500 2
720 3 2 1 800 500 2
576 3 3 640 320 2
461 3 4 1 512 300 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 600 2
720 4 2 800 400 2
576 4 3 1 640 400 2
461 4 4 512 212 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 600 2
720 4 2 800 400 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 600 2
720 4 2 800 450 2
576 4 3 1 640 320 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 500 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 600 1 1
900 5 1 1000 500 1 1
900 5 1 1000 500 1 1
900 5 1 1000 500 1 1
900 5 1 1000 400 1 1
900 5 1 1000 500 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 500 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 600 2
720 6 2 800 400 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 600 2
720 6 2 800 410 2
576 6 3 1 640 350 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 600 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 7 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 550 1 1
100 7 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 600 2
80 8 2 800 400 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 550 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 550
100 8 1 1 1000 550
100 9 1 1000 500
100 9 1 1000 500
100 9 1 1000 550
100 9 1 ' 1000 500
100 9 1 1000 600
80 9 2 1 800 400
100 10 1 1 1000 550
100 10 1 1 1000 550
100 10 1
.
1 1000 600
100 10 1 1 1000 600
100 10 1 1 1000 525
900 11 1 1000 500
900 11 1 1000 550
900 11 1 1000 500
720 11 2 1 800 600
576 11 3 640 320
461 11 4 1 512 300
900 11 1 1000 400
900 11 1 1000 600
900 12 1 1 1000 625
720 12 2 800 400
900 12 1 1 1000 500
720 12 2 800 400
900 12 1 1 1000 550
900 12 1 1 1000 575
900 12 1 1 1000 500
Parameters : d=l . p=.05. Plaver 2 can opt out
tion Session Round Mover Pie Mover
Option Size Demand
100 1 1 1000 500
100 1 1 1000 800
100 1 2 1 1000 600
100 1 3 1000 500
100 1 1 1000 700
100 1 2 1 1000 600
100 1 3 1000 500
100 1 4 1 1000 575
100 1 5 1000 500
100 1 6 1 1000 525
100 1 1 1000 500
100 2 1 1 1000 650
100 2 2 1000 600
100 2 3 1 1000 500
100 2 1 1 1000 600
100 2 2 1000 500
100 2 3 1 1000 550
100 2 4 1000 500
100 2 5 1 1000 550
100 2 1 1 1000 600
100 2 2 1000 500
100 2 3 1 1000 600
100 2 4 1000 525
100 2 5 1 1000 600
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
2
2
2
1 1
1 1
1 1
2
1 1
2
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
Response Session
Ends
1 1
2
2
1 1
2
2
2
2
2
2 1
1 1
2
2
1 1
2
2
2
2
1 1
2
2
2
2
2
LOO 2 6 1000 500 2
100 2 7 1 1000 600 2
100 2 8 1000 525 2
100 2 9 1 1000 550 2
100 2 10 1000 500 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 700 2
100 2 2 1000 600 2
100 2 3 1 1000 550 2
100 2 4 1000 500 1 1
900 3 1 1000 300 2
900 3 2 1 1000 950 2
900 3 3 1000 250 2
900 .3 4 1 1000 910 2
900 3 5 1000 200 2
900 3 6 1 1000 905 2 1
900 3 1 1000 100 2
900 3 2 1 1000 950 2 '
900 3 3 1000 100 2
900 3 4 1 1000 925 2
900 3 5 1000 100 3 1
900 3 1 1000 300 2
900 3 2 1 1000 950 2
900 3 3 1000 250 2
900 3 4 1 1000 925 2
900 3 5 1000 200 2
900 3 6 1 1000 925 2 1
900 3 1 1000 100 2
900 3 2 1 1000 950 2
900 3 3 1000 95 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 950 2
900 4 2 1000 103 2 1
900 4 1 1 1000 950 2
900 4 2 1000 99 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 950 2
900 4 2 1000 200 3 1
900 4 1 1 1000 975 2
900 4 2 1000 100 1 1
900 5 1 1000 99 1 1
900 5 1 1000 100 2
900 5 2
(
1 1000 950 2
900 5 3 ' 1000 95 2
900 5 4 1 1000 940 2 1
900 5 1 1000 125 2
900 5 2 1 1000 950 2
900 5 3 1000 100 2
900 5 4 1 1000 925 1 1
900 5 1 1000 100 2
900 5 2 1 1000 950 2
900 5 3 1000 95 2
900 5 4 1 1000 925 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 950 2
900 6 2 1000 100 2
900 6 3 1 1000 925 2
900 6 4 1000 90 2
900 6 5 1 1000 920 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 950 2
900 6 2 1000 75 1 1
900 6 L 1 1000 950 2 o
900 6 2 L000 125 2 o
900 6 3 1 1000 950 2 o
900 6 4 1000 100 2
900 6 5 1 1000 940 2
900 6 6 1000 80 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 950 2
900 6 2 1000 10 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 2
100 7 2 1 1000 575 2
100 7 3 1000 550 2
100 7 4 1 1000 570 2
100 .7 5 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 2
100 7 2 1 1000 700 2
100 7 3 1000 500 2
100 7 4 1 1000 600 2
100 7 5 1000 525 2
100 7 6 1 1000 525 2
100 7 7 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 2
100 7 2 1 1000 550 2
100 7 3 1000 500 2
100 7 4 1 1000 530 2
100 7 5 1000 500 2
100 7 6 1 1000 530 2
100 7 7 1000 495 1 1
100 1 1 1000 700 2
100 1 2 1 1000 500 1 1
100 1 1 1000 800 2
100 1 2 1 1000 500 1 1
100 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 600 2
100 2 2 1000 500 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 700 2
100 2 2 1000 500 1 1
900 3 1 1000 100 1 1
900 3 1 1000 700 3 1
900 3 1 1000 400 2
900 3 2 1 1000 950 2
900 3 3 1000 200 3 1
900 4 1 1 1000 800 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 900 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 925 2
900 4 2 1000 150 3 1
900 5 1 1000 100 1 1
900 5 1 1000 100 1 1
900 5 1 1000 150 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 900 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 6 1 1 1000 900 1 1
100 7 1 1000 800 2
100 7 2 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 900 2
100 7 2 1 1000 900 2
IV.
LOO 7 3 1000 850 2 1
100 7 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 2
100 8 2 1000 750 2
100 8 3 1 1000 1000 2
100 8 4 1000 501 2
100 8 5 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 667 2
100 9 2 1 1000 400 1 1
100 .9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 10 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 10 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 10 1 1 1000 600 2
100 10 2 1000 500 1 1
900 11 1 1000 200 3 1
900 11 1 1000 150 2
900 11 2 1 1000 900 1 1
900 11 1 1000 200 1 1
900 12 1 1 1000 900 1 1
900 12 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 12 1 1 1000 900 1 1
100 13 1 1000 500 1 1
100 13 1 1000 650 2
100 13 2 1 1000 500 1 1
100 13 1 1000 500 1 1
100 14 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 14 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 14 1 1 1000 500 1 1
900 15 1 1000 100 1 1
900 15 1 1000 1000 3 1
900 15 1 1000 150 2
900 15 2 1 1000 900 1 1
900 16 1 1 1000 900 1 1
900 16 1 1 1000 900 1 1
900 16 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 17 1 1000 900 3 1
900 17 1 1000 99 2
900 17 2 1 1000 800 1 1
900 17 1 1000 150 1 1
900 18 1 1 1000 900 1 1
900 18 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 18 1 1 1000 900 1 1
Parameters: d=0
,
.8. d=.05 . Plaver 2 can opt out
Responseption Session Round Mover Pie Mover Session
Option Size Demand Ends
100 1 1 1000 550 2
80 1 2 1 800 400 1 1
100 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 1 1 1000 800 2
80 1 2 1 800 500 2
64 1 3 640 320 1 1
100 1 1 1000 880 2
10
80 1 2 1 800 500 2 o
64 1 3 640 320 1 1
100 1 L 1000 500 1 l
100 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 1 1 1000 700 2
80 1 2 1 800 425 1 1
100 1 1 L000 800 2
80 1 2 1 800 500 2
64 1 3 640 500 2
51 1 4 1 512 500 2
41 1 5 410 300 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 .2 1 1 1000 550 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 550 2
80 2 2 800 400 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 700 2
80 2 2 800 400 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 700 2
80 2 2 800 400 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 600 2
80 2 2 800 425 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 900 2
80 2 2 800 600 2
64 2 3 1 640 340 1 1
900 3 1 1000 100 1 1
900 3 1 1000 100 1 1
900 3 1 1000 700 3 1
900 3 1 1000 99 1 1
900 3 1 1000 800 3 1
900 3 1 1000 500 3 1
900 3 1 1000 100 1 1
900 3 1 1000 100 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 900 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 805 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 500 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 -14 1
900 4 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 4 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 4 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 4 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 5 1 1000 100 1 1
900 5 1 1000 110 3 1
900 5 1 1000 500 3 1
900 5 1 1000 99 1 1
900 5 1 1000 175 3 1
900 5 1 1000 300 3 1
900 5 1 1000 100 1 1
900 5 1 1000 100 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 6 1 1 1000 900 2
720 6 2 800 400 3 1
900 6 1 1 1000 900 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 500 1 1
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
11
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
100 7 1 1000 800 2
80 1 2 1 800 400 2
64 7 3 640 340 1 1
100 7 1 1000 700 2
80 7 2 1 800 400 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 2
80 7 2 1 800 400 2
64 7 3 640 500 2
51 7 4 1 512 312 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 2
80 7 2 1 800 425 2
64
.
7 3 640 320 1 1
100 7 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 2
80 7 2 1 800 420 1 1
100 7 1 1000 700 2
80 7 2 1 800 400 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 2
80 8 2 800 500 2
64 8 3 1 640 320 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 600 2
80 8 2 800 400 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 450 2
80 8 2 800 700 2
64 8 3 1 640 320 1 1
100 9 1 1000 800 2
80 9 2 1 800 420 2
64 9 3 640 321 1 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 600 2
80 9 2 1 800 400 1 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 800 2
80 9 2 1 800 400 1 1
Parameters
:
d-1. P-.50. ineither piaver car i opt out
Responseption Session Round Mover Pie Mover Session
Option Size Demand Ends
100 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 1 1 1000 800 2 1
100 1 1 1000 600 2 1
100 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 700 2 1
100 2 1 1 1000 600 1 1
12
100
100
100
100
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
2
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
.3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
3
1
2
3
4
1
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1 1000 600
1 1000 500
1 1000 500
1 1000 500
1000 500
L 1000 800
1000 700
1 1000 700
1000 600
1 1000 800
1000 500
1000 550
1 1000 1000
1000 500
1 1000 900
1 1000 800
1000 500
1 1000 700
1 1000 700
1000 650
1 1000 800
1000 550
1 1000 600
1 1000 1000
1000 700
1 1000 900
1000 500
1 1000 900
1000 200
1 1000 900
1 1000 800
1000 500
1000 650
1000 700
1000 600
1000 450
1000 200
1 1000 550
1 1000 1000
1 1000 900
1 1000 800
1 1000 900
1 1000 700
1000 500
1000 800
1 1000 500
1000 800
1 1000 500
1000 800
1000 800
1 1000 500
1000 800
1000 700
1 1000 500
1000 600
1 1000 550
1 1000 500
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
13
VI
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 800 2
100 9 2 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 600 2
100 9 2 1 1000 500 2
100 9 3 1000 600 2 1
100 9 1 1000 800 2
100 .9 2 1 1000 450 1 1
100 9 1 1000 600 1 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 10 1 1 1000 600 2
100 10 2 1000 500 1 1
100 10 1 1 1000 500 2
100 10 2 1000 800 2 1
100 10 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 10 1 1 1000 600 2
100 10 2 1000 600 1 1
100 10 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 10 1 1 1000 500 1 1
900 11 1 1000 500 2 1
900 11 1 1000 500 2 1
900 11 1 1000 400 2 1
900 11 1 1000 500 2 1
900 11 1 1000 200 1 1
900 11 1 1000 100 1 1
900 12 1 1 1000 550 1 1
900 12 1 1 1000 1000 2
900 12 2 1000 500 2
900 12 3 1 1000 1000 2 1
900 12 1 1 1000 950 2
900 12 2 1000 500 2
900 12 3 1 1000 925 2 1
900 12 1 1 1000 800 2
900 12 2 1000 300 1 1
900 12 1 1 1000 900 1 1
900 12 1 1 1000 700 1 1
Parameters: d=0
,
.8. p=.50 . neither Dlave:r can opt out
ition Session Round Mover Pie Mover Response Session
Option Size Demand Ends
100 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 1 1 1000 640 1 1
100 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 1 1 1000 500 2 1
100 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 1 1 1000 400 1 1
100 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 600 2 1
100 2 1 1 1000 510 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 600 1 1
14
100
100
100
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
720
900
900
720
900
720
900
720
900
720
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
2
2
2
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
5
5
5
5
5
5
5
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
7
7
7
7
7
7
7
8
8
8
8
8
8
8
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1 1000 1000
1 1000 800
1 1000 600
1000 600
1000 700
1000 450
1000 200
1000 500
1000 400
1000 600
1 1000 800
800 500
1 1000 900
1 1000 910
800 400
1 1000 600
800 500
1 1000 1000
800 75
1 1000 800
800 400
1 1000 700
1000 200
1000 600
1000 900
1000 500
1000 575
1000 85
1000 500
1 1000 800
1 1000 850
1 1000 910
1 1000 1000
1 1000 1000
1 1000 900
1 1000 700
1000 700
1000 500
1000 600
1000 900
1000 600
1000 500
1000 700
1 1000 500
1 1000 550
1 1000 510
1 1000 600
1 1000 500
1 1000 500
1 1000 500
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
2
1
1
2
2
1
2
1
1
2
1
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
VII Parameters d=l
.
p=.5Q. Player 2 can opt out
Option Session Round Mover Pie Mover
Option Size Demand
100 1 1 1000 500
100 1 1 1000 500
Response Session
Ends
1 1
1 1
15
LOO
100
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
LOO
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
900
LOO
LOO
2
2
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VIII
100 7 2 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 900 2
100 7 2 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 800 2
100 7 2 1 1000 700 1 1
100 7 1
•
1000 600 1 1
100 7 1 1000 800 2
100 7 2 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 800 2
100 7 2 1 1000 600 1 1
100 7 1 1000 800 2
100 7 2 1 1000 400 1 1
100 .8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 600 2
100 8 2 1000 900 2 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 600 2
100 8 2 1000 650 2 1
100 8 1 1 1000 600 2
100 8 2 1000 500 2 1
100 8 1 1 1000 600 2
100 8 2 1000 500 1 1
Parameters: d==0.8. p- .50. Plaver 2 cari opt out
Responseition Session Round Mover Pie Mover Session
Option Size Demand Ends
100 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 1 1 1000 600 2
80 1 2 1 800 400 1 1
100 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 1 1 1000 800 2
80 1 2 1 800 400 1 1
100 1 1 1000 700 2
80 1 2 1 800 400 1 1
100 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 1 1 1000 700 3 1
100 2 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 550 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 950 2
80 2 2 800 500 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 2 1 1 1000 500 1 1
900 3 1 1000 600 3 1
900 3 1 1000 280 3 1
900 3 1 1000 95 1 1
900 3 1 1000 75 1 1
900 3 1 1000 500 3 1
900 3 1 1000 500 3 1
900 3 1 1000 100 1 1
900 4 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 4 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
900 4 1 1 1000 -1 4 1
17
900 4 1 1 1000 -1 u 1
900 4 1 I L000 950 2
900 4 1 I 1000 -1 4
900 4 1 1 1000 850 1
900 5 1 1000 700 3
900 5 1 1000 100 1
900 5 1 1000 95 1
900 5 1 1000 95 1
900 5 1 1000 200 3
900 5 1 1000 600 3
900 5 1 1000 100 1
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 4
900 .6 1 1 1000 850 1
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 4
900 6 1 1 1000 975 1
900 6 1 1 1000 950 1
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 k 1
900 6 1 1 1000 -1 4
100 7 1 1000 875 2
80 7 2 1 800 400 2
64 7 3 640 600 2
51 7 4 1 512 256 2
41 7 5 410 350 2 1
100 7 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 1 1
100 7 1 1000 700 2
80 7 2 1 800 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 800 2
80 7 2 1 800 500 1 1
100 7 1 1000 600 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 2
80 8 2 800 600 2 1
100 8 1 1 1000 500 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 800 2
80 8 2 800 500 2 1
100 8 1 1 1000 600 1 1
100 8 1 1 1000 700 2
80 8 2 800 400 1 1
100 9 1 1000 600 2 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 600 1 1
100 9 1 1000 600 1 1
100 9 1 1000 500 1 1
100 9 1 1000 600 2 1
100 9 1 1000 400 1 1



